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NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
DIVESTITURE IN SOUTH AFRICA
WILIAM C. MOTr*
We are in the middle of a divestment struggle. A recent Washington Post
headline read "Reagan to undertake review of U.S. policy toward South
Africa." The President assembled all of his experts for a conference. Addi-
tional meetings are scheduled. Present at the initial conference were the
Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the
head of the National Security Council, Bud McFarlane, the congressional lob-
bying team, and several others.
The Secretary of State, who is or should be the chief architect of U.S. foreign
policy, said about the bill that Congress will present in the next couple of
weeks declaring sanctions on South Africa: "Now I am quite aware that some
of the proposals now before the Congress are not, strictly speaking, divest-
ment bills. Instead, they are couched in terms of conditional bans on new
investment or new loans unless certain political changes are made within a
year or two. Other proposals would make the voluntary Sullivan Code man-
datory and severely penalize firms that do not comply adequately." (Two
of the firms that do not comply are the Washington Post and the New York
Times. Just how that is going to work out, I don't know.) "Well intentioned
as these proposals may be," said Secretary Schulz, "let us not kid ourselves
about their likely effect. Considering the additional risks and uncertainties
which such legislation would create, U.S. firms are likely to conclude that
their continued presence in South Africa is simply no longer worth the candle.
The result will be reduced American influence."
Some explanation of the Sullivan Code is necessary. The author of the code,
the Reverend Leon Sullivan, is a black ghetto preacher in Philadelphia. He
was elected to the Board of Directors of General Motors. At his first meeting,
he moved to pull General Motors' operations out of South Africa. The other
directors said, "Well, Dr. Sullivan, why don't you go down to South Africa,
at our expense, take a look at the situation, come back and report to us at
the next meeting as to what you think General Motors should do." The
Reverend Sullivan went to South Africa. At the next meeting, the directors
were ready to hear his report. The Reverend began: "I made a mistake. If
American and western corporations pulled out of South Africa there will be
* Rear Admiral, U.S.N. (Ret.); Chairman, Advisory Committee, National Strategic Materials
and Minerals Program, U.S. Department of Interior.
Speaker's footnote: After listening to all viewpoints and options from his staff, President Reagan
imposed limited sanctions on South Africa, forestalling for the time being more punitive sanc-
tions voted by Congress.
Author's Note: Since the dialogue described above, President Reagan has imposed limited
sanctions, thus forestalling punitive congressional sanctions. They have not worked notably well
because other countries have not joined.
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a revolution and one million people will be killed and 98 percent of them
will be black."
"Well," the others replied, "how do you propose to solve this problem?"
The Reverend continued, "I think all American corporations ought to
operate in South Africa under a set of principles."
The others said: "You thought of it, Reverend; why don't you draw up
the principles?"
So, the Reverend drafted the Sullivan principles, which have been successful
in breaking down what is called petty apartheid.
When I went to South Africa I visited several schools, such as Saint An-
thony's School and the Pace School, which is run by the Episcopal church.
All of the equipment in those schools was donated by American corpora-
tions. I have lectured in high schools in this country and have never seen
equipment equal to what U.S. corporations have donated to these schools
in an effort to raise the level of black education. The good that American
corporations have done in South Africa may have been best expressed by Lucy
Muvbelo, who is the head of the ladies' garment workers union in South
Africa. She says, in the foreword to a book called The Politics of Sentiment:
Churches and Foreign Investment in South Africa:
The issue of external investment in South Africa is one that deeply
affects all of us who live in this beautiful, paradoxical and com-
plex land. To proponents of isolation and disinvestment and
embargos, I must say, don't break off contact and don't advocate
disengagement and withdrawal of foreign investments. The vitality
of South Africa's economy offers more hope to South African
blacks than destructive forms of pressure from abroad. By insisting
on the withdrawal of foreign companies, even of American firms,
disinvestment advocates are asking a substantial number of black
workers to sacrifice their jobs .... to sacrifice their only realistic
means of attaining wider opportunities and higher standards.
For her pains, her house was firebombed by radical blacks. This is only one
of the problems that exist in South Africa.
An explanation of presidential options is in order. I served as an aide to
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and I worked in some capacity for
Eisenhower and Kennedy. I first heard "What are my options?" from Presi-
dent Roosevelt when I was the presidential intelligence briefer. President
Roosevelt would assemble the Joint Chiefs of Staff and say with respect to
something like convoys going to Murmansk, "What are my options? What's
Stalin going to think?"
When I served as President Truman's aide, I had the job of taking Truman
on his famous six o'clock morning walks. We were walking one morning,
and I struck up a conversation by saying, "Mr. President, tell me how you
happened to make the decision to drop the atomic bomb." He replied, "Com-
mander, I had people lined up on both sides of my desk. Some of them were
saying 'don't do this. It will be the most inhumane act in the history of
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mankind.' Others were saying, 'you have to do it in order to save 500,000
American lives'." He continued, "You were on the planning staff for the
invasion of Japan and wasn't that your estimate?"
I replied, "Yes it was, Mr. President." So he said, "I made the decision,
after considering all of my options. I have never been sorry for it and I never
will be." And he never was. Eisenhower also used this technique, which is
an army technique.
In Kennedy's administration, there was the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.
On October 15, 1962, a U-2 airplane the U.S. had sent over Cuba returned
with pictures of missiles. Kennedy knew he had to do something, so he called
in his advisers. Kennedy asked: "What are my options?" We said, "Well,
Mr. President, you can invade Cuba." He replied, "Go get ready to do it."
Not many people know that we loaded Marines on transports at Camp
Pendleton and started them around through the Panama Canal.
"What else can I do?" he asked. We answered, "You can have an air strike,
as surgical as possible."
"Get ready to do it," Kennedy ordered. So, we sent a strike force down
to McDill Air Force Base in Florida.
"What else?" he asked. We answered, "You can blockade Cuba, but if
you do any one of these three things, Mr. President, they are acts of war."
Believe it or not, there are some people who have argued that the United
States Navy should blockade South Africa and not let anything in or out.
This would be an act of war. You will have to take the ships, including the
Soviet ships, into the nearest port and intern the crew, if you blockade them.
Anyway, Kennedy again asked, "Well, do I have any other option?" We
replied, "Yes sir, Mr. President. There is a theory in international law that
was used by one of your predecessors, called interdiction. You can interdict.
You can tell ships that are coming through, 'If you're not carrying contra-
band, you can come through. Otherwise, you cannot'." We put this in a pro-
clamation that I drafted. We drew a circle around Cuba and the first Soviet
ship that arrived at the 500-mile limit shut down its engines.
In the Grenada situation, President Reagan had a formal team of lawyers
to advise him. They would camp on bunks at the White House so they could
advise the President as to what legal options existed in cases of emergency.
In the case of South African divestment by American corporations, where
the Washington Post indicated President Reagan consulted all his experts,
I was asked by one of the principals to comment on the subject. It was a
modest input, but the President was looking for all his options. I reviewed
two books for my report, one entitled The Politics of Sentiment and the other
entitled Disinvestment: Is It Legal, Is It Moral, Is It Productive? The books
conclude that divestment is not legal, moral, or productive. The latter book
contains a pertinent statement by Derek Bok, the president of Harvard Univer-
sity. Harvard had before it the exact same issue of divestment that is con-
fronting the University of Oklahoma. I would urge those considering this prob-
lem at the University of Oklahoma to read these two books in order to make
a reasoned decision, based not on emotion, but facts.
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The president of Harvard wrote:., "I do believe the tactics of divestment
will not succeed and that they will cost the university money. The line is crossed
when a university goes beyond expressing opinions and tries to exert economic
pressure by divesting stock or engaging in a boycott in order to press views
on outside organizations. I find no basis for concluding that universities will
help defeat apartheid in South Africa by agreeing to divest." He closed by
saying, "The fact remains that Harvard's resources were entrusted to us for
academic purposes and not as a means for demonstrating our position on
apartheid or on other manifest injustices and evils around the world. I con-
tinue to believe, as I did in 1978, that the arguments for divestment are not
convincing and that Harvard should not adopt such a policy."
The Politics of Sentiment is a religious book about churches and foreign
investment in South Africa. It is published by the Ethics and Public Policy
Center in Washington, D.C. I would advise the people considering this prob-
lem at the University of Oklahoma to read these books and make a rea-
soned decision before they jump aboard the divestment train.
Now, let us get back to Reagan and his advisers. Reagan turned to the
Secretary of State, Mr. Schulz, and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr.
Crocker, and said: "You've told me that disinvestment in South Africa is
not going to work unless our allies will go along with us. Are you going to
be able to convince our allies that they should go along with any bill that
the Congress sends down?" Margaret Thatcher does not agree with divest-
ment and will not endorse it, and neither will West Germany, Japan, or France.
Ed Noble, the president of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, and I went
to South Africa to look at the SASOL plants, which are the most magnificent
technological achievement in the world with respect to the production of syn-
thetic fuels. I noticed that even though the plants were built by the Fluor
Corporation, an American corporation, there was very little American equip-
ment in them. I asked why. I was told "You had better ask the foreign minister
about that, Mr. Pik Botha. He'll tell you." So then Ed and I went to see
the foreign minister, and I asked, "How come?"
He answered, "Well, I was the ambassador in Washington at the time and
Bob Fluor and I went to the Export-Import Bank, which was headed by Bill
Casey, who is now the head of the CIA. We got a $500 million loan approved,
and it lasted until we got to the Oval Office. Jerry Ford was running for
President and he wanted no part of it. So what happened? Germany, Japan,
and France came in and supplied virtually all of the equipment that went
into the SASOL plants."
This is one of the problems associated with divestment. If you are not
careful, it will turn around and bite you. I just noticed that the American
banks, Chase Manhattan and some others, have withdrawn all investments
and loans from South Africa. I then turned over to the financial page of
the Wall Street Journal and I saw where the German and Swiss banks are
getting ready to fill the vacuum. So as I said, these things are frequently
counterproductive.
When President Reagan hears from Schulz and Crocker, he turns to Max
Friedersdorf, one of the chief lobbyists. The President might say, "Max, how
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many senators can you turn around so if I veto this bill they won't override
my veto?"
Max would answer, "Well, I'm working on it, Mr. President, I'm working
on it."
I have been requested by an organization called the Conservative Research
Fund to work on two senators from Virginia, Warner and Trible. What I
plan to do is make them read these books, or the briefs of these books, so
they will understand the problems and dangers in divestment.
At this point the President might call in C. Fred Bergston, the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury in the Carter administration. He will say to him,
"Now Mr. Bergston, I read where you testified in Congress that the United
States is now vulnerable to South African economic sanctions. The truth is,
you testified, that South Africa has more cards to play than we do in this
area. What do you mean by that, Mr. Bergston? What do you mean they
have more cards to play than we do?"
I will demonstrate what Mr. Bergston meant. Seventy to eighty percent of
the fuel from the Middle East goes around the Cape. All of the minerals
that come out of southern Africa are loaded usually in Durban or East Lon-
don, and they go around the Cape too. It is a vital supply line. At the foot
of the Cape are the Simonstown dockyards, which we have been unable to
use since 1967 when Mr. McNamara said no American ship could make port
in South Africa. In my opinion, we could not fight a war in this area without
using the Simonstown dockyards. The Soviets have a drydock in Maputu,
Mozambique, and on the other side of southern Africa in Angola. We do
not have anything in southern Africa. The United States has a base at Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean, but a nonnuclear destroyer has to refuel several
times before getting from there to anywhere. The practical effect of this is
what was illustrated to the British in the Falklands War. The British had horri-
ble logistic problems in the Falklands War. They wanted to use Simonstown
very badly. Unfortunately, the South Africans got angry at them when they
pulled out in 1975. When informal approaches were made to the South Africans
to see if the British could use Simonstown for logistic support in the Falklands
operation, they were told "No! You guys deserted us. Don't come to us when
you are in trouble." That is the kind of situation this country should avoid
because we may need to use Simonstown if we get involved in any kind of
trouble in that area.
"What did you mean economically, Mr. Bergston?" might be the Presi-
dent's next question. South Africa has all the minerals we need, such as
platinum, palladium, manganese, cobalt, and chromium. We do not have them
in this country and they are not available to us elsewhere. We get them from
southern Africa. One of the first things Reagan did was to buy $78 million
worth of cobalt from Zaire. It came by rail through Zambia and Zimbabwe
to a South African port. We are completely dependent on the South African
railway system to get any of their minerals. And if you push Botha, the
Afrikaaner, too hard, he may say, "I'm not going to carry your products
anymore." That would cause economic disaster in that part of the world.
The alternate source for a good many of these minerals is the Soviet Union.
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Does the United States want to be reliant on the Soviet Union for its supply
of platinum? An automobile cannot be made in this country without platinum
because it goes into the catalytic converter. Specialty steel cannot be produced
in this country without cobalt and chromium. Coming in from the Oklahoma
City airport I saw drilling platforms that have drill bits. Those drill'bits can-
not be made without these minerals. The U.S. does not have these minerals.
A dependency exists that should be recognized. Our committee, of which Mr.
Ary of Kerr-McGee is a member, looked at this problem. We summoned Chet
Crocker to tell us about the policy of constructive engagement. After con-
sulting with him, we unanimously recommended no sanctions.
Our recommendation that went to the Secretary of the Interior and to the
President was simple. We think the foreign policy of the United States ought
to be conducted in such a way as to ensure access, which is the magic word,
to these critical minerals that the United States does not have and that southern
Africa has, whether it be Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or South Africa. All
the minerals must come out through South Africa.
Therefore, we feel that sanctions of any kind in this area should not be
imposed against'South Africa because sanctions have never worked. They did
not work with chromium in Rhodesia. There was an embargo on chromium
when attempts were being made to get Ian Smith out of Rhodesia. What
hapjened? The Soviets came in and bought up the chromium; the U.S. then
bought it on the European market for three times the price. The Soviets trained
some Katangese rebels through their Cuban mercenaries in Angola, and these
rebels went after the cobalt mines in Zaire. The United States brought in French
and Belgian paratroopers to stop the insurrection and get the mines operating
again. In the meantime, the price of cobalt quintupled on the American market.
Thus, when considering imposing sanctions one must look at the effect such
sanctions will have on the U.S.
Let me conclude by, citing one paragraph from another book. It is entitled
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, and it is
published by the Institute for International Economics. The head of that in-
stitute is C. Fred Bergston, whom I quoted earlier with respect to the fact
the South Africans have more economic weapons than the United States. This
is his advice. It is entitled "Look before you leap with respect to sanctions."
The country that imposes sanctions is called the "sender government." I quote:
"The sender government should think through its means and objectives before
making a final decision to deploy sanctions. Leaders in the sender country
should be confident that their goals are within their grasp and that they can
impose sufficient economic pain to command the attention of the target country
(which in this case is South Africa), that their efforts will not simply prompt
offsetting policies by other major powers, and that their chosen sanctions
will not impose insupportable costs on their domestic constituents and foreign
allies.
"These conditions will arise," continues the paragraph, "on only infre-
quent occasions, and even then, the odds of success are not great. The pru-
dent leader will weigh carefully the cost and benefits of economic sanctions
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before resorting to their use in foreign policy ventures." Right now, that pru-
dent leader is President Reagan and he is now conducting a cost-benefit analysis
with his staff.
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